The Common Law as Silver Slippers by Crawford, Bridget J.
Pace University 
DigitalCommons@Pace 
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law 
2019 
The Common Law as Silver Slippers 
Bridget J. Crawford 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty 
 Part of the Common Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. 
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
Copyright 2019 by Bridget J. Crawford Vol. 114 
Northwestern University Law Review 
131 
Symposium on Anita Bernstein’s  
The Common Law Inside the Female Body 
THE COMMON LAW AS SILVER SLIPPERS 
Bridget J. Crawford* 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 131 
I. COMMON LAW PROTECTION FOR WOMEN’S BODIES ............................................. 133 
II. REACH OF THE COMMON LAW .............................................................................. 134 
III. LESSONS FROM THE COMMON LAW ....................................................................... 136 
IV. VIEWPOINTS ON THE COMMON LAW ..................................................................... 138 
CONCLUSION: THE COMMON LAW AS SILVER SLIPPERS ................................................ 139 
 
“Your Silver Shoes will carry you over the desert,” replied Glinda. “If 
you had known their power you could have gone back to your Aunt Em 
the very first day you came to this country . . . . All you have to do is to 
knock the heels together three times and command the shoes to carry 
you wherever you wish to go.” 
—L. Frank Baum† 
INTRODUCTION 
Toward the end of L. Frank Baum’s classic tale, The Wonderful Wizard 
of Oz, Glinda, the Good Witch of the South, makes a startling revelation to 
Dorothy. During the girl’s entire sojourn in Oz, Dorothy always had the 
power to return home to her beloved Kansas. She did not need any help from 
the Scarecrow, the Tin Woodman, the Cowardly Lion, or even the Wizard 
himself. All Dorothy had to do was click together the heels of the shoes she 
was already wearing. Some readers interpret Dorothy’s shoes as a metaphor 
for inner strength: We already have within us the resources we need to face 
any situation; we simply do not realize it. That message, embodied in 
Glinda’s words to Dorothy, now adorns a plethora of inspirational shirts, 
coffee mugs, and dorm room posters. 
 
 * Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. 
 † L. FRANK BAUM, THE WONDERFUL WIZARD OF OZ 257 (Books of Wonder & William Morrow and 
Co., Inc. 1987) (1900). 
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Dorothy walked, ran, and skipped down the Yellow Brick Road in shoes 
with powers she did not understand at the beginning of her journey. So, too, 
have law students, legal scholars, lawyers, and judges been working with the 
common law without realizing its full power. Professor Anita Bernstein’s 
book, The Common Law Inside the Female Body,1 is an erudite investigation 
into the history and operation of the common law. Bernstein’s careful and 
wide-ranging study leads to her arresting thesis: The common law—an old, 
unpredictable, and slow system that has been there all along—has 
tremendous power to support and even advance women’s legal claims to 
personal liberty. In other words, women have always had the common law 
right to be treated equally to men. We simply have not realized it. 
Bernstein makes a convincing argument that the common law tradition 
has a unifying theoretical commitment: “[T]he law ought to leave individuals 
alone and to honor this ascribed desire in the face of incursions or threats by 
other individuals.”2 Bernstein finds expressions of this commitment in 
multiple substantive areas. Criminal law embraces a right of self-defense (“If 
you are attacking me with deadly force, I have a right to resist with deadly 
force.”).3 Tort law does not impose on a bystander the duty to rescue, absent 
a specific type of prior relationship with the endangered (“I don’t have to 
jump into the lake to save a drowning stranger I stumbled upon.”).4 Contract 
law generally prefers monetary damages over specific performance (“You 
can’t make me do what I don’t want to, even if I signed a contract to do it.”).5 
Property law limits an owner’s liability, based on the owner’s relationship to 
a person who enters the property (“You can’t make me liable for an injury 
suffered by a trespasser who then fell and broke his ankle on my land.”).6 
Together this adds up to what Bernstein refers to as the common law’s 
respect for “condoned self-regard,” the ability to say what one does not 
want.7 Condoned self-regard expresses itself as a negative liberty—the right 
to be free from a particular obligation or duty. 
Bernstein enhances gender equality discourse with her argument that 
this negative liberty provides a framework for understanding women’s rights 
to bodily integrity. Because negative liberty—the right to say no—means 
that “boundary-crossing into the personal identity and space of a person qua 
person is wrong,” then the common law as it has been interpreted for 
 
 1 ANITA BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW INSIDE THE FEMALE BODY (2019). 
 2 Id. at 9. 
 3 See id. The imagined party’s statements throughout this paragraph are mine, not Bernstein’s. 
 4 See id. at 10, 156–57. 
 5 See id. at 10.  
 6 Id. at 10–11. 
 7 Id. at 8, 11. 
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centuries already secures women the right to not be “penetrated, occupied, 
or put to use by another person.”8 The common law, then, offers women 
ultimate protection that goes with their bodies, wherever those bodies go. 
This is what Bernstein means by the common law inside the female body.9 
I. COMMON LAW PROTECTION FOR WOMEN’S BODIES 
Bernstein tests her theory of the common law in two particular contexts: 
rape and unwanted pregnancy. In considering involuntary penetration of a 
woman’s body by another individual, Bernstein sees an easy case.  
As a self-possessor, she may refuse access to her body—and especially to her 
vagina—for good reason, for no reason, and out of a motive of which she might 
be or ought to be ashamed . . . . The common law unequivocally supports her 
veto of sexual intercourse regardless of where her refusal originates.10  
In Bernstein’s view, women have dominion over their bodies just as property 
owners have dominion over their land.11 The person in charge—the woman 
or the landowner—has absolute authority to determine who and what enters 
(the person’s body or property) when, how, and where. For that reason, 
Bernstein says, women who have been raped have the right to receive cash 
damages, and a woman may use deadly force against an intruder into her 
body.12 In the case of an unwanted pregnancy, Bernstein extends the 
“invasion of physical geography” concept and also highlights how forcing a 
woman to carry and bear a child she does not want can lead to physical pain 
and financial consequences, such as medical bills or lost employment time.13 
Being forced to remain pregnant is the ultimate transgression against 
women’s negative liberty right to not be forced to use their bodies in ways 
they do not desire.14 
 
 8 Id. at 15. 
 9 By “inside the female body,” Bernstein explains that she means “female sexual and reproductive 
anatomy as it relates to what individuals experience . . . .” Id. at 22. She elaborates further that her focus 
is on how humans experience everyday life. Thus, “[c]an a person have a female body as understood in 
this book without having a vagina and a uterus? I think so.” Id. at 24. Historically speaking, “[t]he 
common law did not have to think about socially constraining group memberships like race, gender, age, 
wealth, or religion . . . because its leaders did not have to think about them.” Id. at 26. Bernstein’s 
capacious understanding of the common law would extend its repository of rights to all people equally, 
without regard to sex, race, gender, age, wealth, or religion, or any similar difference. 
 10 Id. at 115. 
 11 Id. at 115–16. 
 12 Id. at 116. 
 13 Id. at 143–46. 
 14 Id. at 142–47 (“Physical pain, check. Invasion of physical geography, check. Loss of money, 
check. Being told to do what we don’t want to do, check.”). 
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Inspired by my own reaction to Bernstein’s contributions to legal 
scholarship, I invited other scholars to participate in this online Symposium 
by sharing written reflections on The Common Law Inside the Female Body. 
The contributors have a range of teaching and scholarly expertise, including 
Civil Procedure, Critical Race Theory, Employment Discrimination, Family 
Law, Feminist Legal Theory, Immigration Law, Intellectual Property, 
International Human Rights Law, Law and Religion, Legal Rhetoric and 
Writing, and Torts. Including voices informed by different professional 
backgrounds, academic interests, and unique perspectives is an intentional 
choice rooted in the substantive message of Bernstein’s book. The 
commentators live in different parts of the country, deploy diverse 
methodologies, and have unique scholarly and pedagogical interests and 
concerns. But the common law belongs to all of us: Anita Bernstein, who 
wrote a brilliant book; the six contributors to this online Symposium; the 
students who publish this law review; anyone who reads Bernstein’s book or 
these Essays; and anyone who studies or thinks about the law, including 
members of the general public. Each of us rightfully can and must engage 
with the legacy and promise of the common law. The contributions to this 
Symposium facilitate that effort. Like Bernstein’s book, the review Essays 
articulate our highest collective aspirations that the law can and will continue 
to develop in the service of meaningful equality for all people. 
The substantive contributions to this Symposium engage in one or more 
of three broad intellectual moves: (1) testing and exploring the limits of 
Bernstein’s thesis; (2) applying Bernstein’s idea of condoned self-regard to 
particular areas of legal interest and expertise otherwise outside Bernstein’s 
focus; and (3) questioning the common law from viewpoints of those who 
historically have received (and often continue to receive) unequal treatment 
under law. 
II. REACH OF THE COMMON LAW 
Three Essays in the collection seek to identify the limits to Bernstein’s 
argument that the common law adequately secures women’s rights. 
Professor David Cohen takes up Bernstein’s analysis of the common law 
right to abortion in his Essay, The Promise and Peril of a Common Law Right 
to Abortion.15 He contrasts Bernstein’s understanding of women’s common 
law rights to bodily autonomy—and thus the right to refuse to carry a 
pregnancy—with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Roe v. Wade.16 Cohen 
explains how Bernstein’s analysis of the common law might help 
 
 15 David S. Cohen, The Promise and Peril of a Common Law Right to Abortion, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 
ONLINE 140 (2019). 
 16 Id. at 140–41. 
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conservative Justices find jurisprudential support for a woman’s right to 
abortion. He invites readers to consider the possible negative consequences 
of positioning abortion rights as negative liberties—i.e., a right not to have 
one’s body invaded, or the right not to be forced to suffer certain physical or 
financial burdens.17 If a woman becomes pregnant as the result of consensual 
sex, Cohen forecasts (as does Bernstein) that there will be some who will 
argue that the woman consented to all of the consequences of that 
intercourse, including pregnancy.18 Cohen therefore would like to develop a 
more robust defense to this argument.19 He also points out that the common 
law is subject to override by legislation, and attentive state legislators might 
draft laws with Bernstein’s conception of women’s common law rights in 
mind.20 Cohen contemplates the complicated relationship between negative 
liberties and rights, placing greater hope in the articulation of a positive right 
to abortion as a way of making sure that access extends fully and 
meaningfully to all women.21 
Like Cohen, Professor Joanna Grossman focuses on Bernstein’s 
grounding of abortion rights in the common law. In Women Are (Allegedly) 
People, Too,22 Grossman enthusiastically explores possible applications of 
Bernstein’s theories: “And, oh boy, the common law contains some juicy 
stuff that really could be deployed to advance the cause of gender equality.”23 
Grossman is highly persuaded, as she says anyone who reads Bernstein’s 
book will be, “that the common law supports a right to abortion far broader 
than the Constitution guarantees.”24 Like Bernstein herself (and Cohen in his 
response), Grossman notes that state statutes limiting a woman’s right to 
abortion would override any common law rights, and she cautions against 
leaving behind constitutional arguments, a “both/and” approach that 
Bernstein also embraces.25 
In The Common Law as a Terrain of Feminist Struggle, Professor Cyra 
Akila Choudhury lauds Bernstein’s excavation of the common law as “of 
critical importance to women.”26 Choudhury focuses on nuances in 
 
 17 See id. at 145–48 and accompanying notes. 
 18 Id. at 145–46. 
 19 See id.  
 20 Id. at 146. 
 21 Id. at 147–48. 
 22 Joanna L. Grossman, Women Are (Allegedly) People, Too, 114 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 149 
(2019). 
 23 Id. at 150. 
 24 Id. at 156. 
 25 Id. at 158–59; see also BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 178–84. 
 26 Cyra Akila Choudhury, The Common Law as a Terrain of Feminist Struggle, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 
ONLINE 160, 161 (2019). 
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Bernstein’s formulation of women’s negative liberty rights in their own 
bodies, such as their rights to not be raped and their rights to not be forced 
to carry a pregnancy to term against their will.27 Choudhury asks whether the 
contours of negative rights might differ depending on who is doing the 
invading. She observes that “while one might be able to repel the intrusions 
of a private individual as a trespasser, one may not be able to repel the 
state.”28 Bernstein almost certainly would agree that this is a distinction with 
a difference, as she openly acknowledges the common law’s limits: “I do 
not—I cannot—contend that the common law can be counted on to safeguard 
the entitlement of persons not to have do what they don’t what to do. . . . 
Who may announce this aversion and get backed from the state has been 
another matter.”29 So, for example, whether descendants of slaves should 
receive financial reparations, or whether women might receive financial 
compensation for being forced to carry a pregnancy to term, would be 
rendered political questions of power, not matters of common law principle. 
Taken together, the Essays of Cohen, Grossman, and Choudhury 
celebrate Bernstein’s focus on the common law. But they also serve as 
warning flags to the reader who might be tempted to read Bernstein’s thesis 
too narrowly. The common law is not the only tool available to secure 
women’s rights; it is simply a forgotten (or long-neglected) one that should 
be resurrected as part of a larger legal strategy. 
III. LESSONS FROM THE COMMON LAW 
The second group of Essays applies Bernstein’s idea of condoned self-
regard to the unexpected areas of intellectual property and employment law. 
One of the nation’s leading intellectual property scholars, Professor Margaret 
Chon, uses Bernstein’s study of the common law as a springboard for 
contemplating larger questions about how the law is learned, taught, and 
interpreted.30 Chon takes inspiration from Bernstein’s “twin grounds of 
condoned self-regard and negative liberty” to explore the statute-based 
intellectual property areas of copyright, patent, and trademark.31 Copyright 
has dual concerns, as Chon explains: the negative right of the holder of the 
intellectual property (i.e., the right not to be infringed upon), and the positive 
right of any alleged infringer to “fair use” of another’s intellectual property.32 
 
 27 See id. at 164–65. 
 28 Id. at 165. 
 29 BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 53. 
 30 Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property Infringement and the Right to Say No, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 
ONLINE 169 (2019). 
 31 Id. at 169–71. 
 32 Id. at 172–74. 
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Intellectual property rights writ large are concerned primarily with 
commercial interests (exploitation for unfair or no value).33 Chon explains 
that intellectual property law’s primary concern with commercial harms may 
cause it to ignore certain common law traditions: “[T]he overly-narrow view 
of IP as a set of commercial rights negates the intertwined history of common 
law privacy and statutory publication in copyright law, not to mention the 
various intersectional approaches of IP more broadly within torts-like human 
rights regimes.”34 In Chon’s analysis, Bernstein’s capacious approach to the 
common law is entirely relevant to intellectual property. Familiar common 
law doctrines might help answer both the question of whether consumers can 
refuse to share data with companies that maintain online social media 
platforms, for example, and the question of whether women (and others) can 
assert robust rights to be free from online harassment.35 In Chon’s 
understanding, intellectual property law need not rely exclusively on its 
statutory scaffolding. It is resilient—and complex—enough to make use of 
both codified law and common law frameworks with human-centered and 
flexible dimensions. 
Like Chon, Professor Maritza Reyes makes concrete Bernstein’s claims 
about the power of the common law by applying the claims to unexpected 
terrain—the employment context. Reyes’s Essay, The Female Body in the 
Workplace: Judges and the Common Law,36 takes particular inspiration from 
the third chapter of Bernstein’s book: “Women Too May Say No to What 
They Don’t Want.”37 Reyes develops a list of her own (and certainly many 
women’s) “Do Not Wants” for the workplace: 
I Do Not Want to smile all the time just to make people feel comfortable all 
around me . . . . I Do Not Want to have to remind colleagues that what the man 
said is what I previously said, and I should get credit for it . . . . I Do Not Want 
the same or usually heavier workload for less pay.38  
Although judges should be conversant with the methods and commitments 
of the common law, Reyes laments what she perceives as judges’ lack of 
“fellow-feeling,” a common law imperative that Bernstein identifies.39 Reyes 
 
 33 Id. at 174–75. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 171. 
 36 Maritza I. Reyes, The Female Body in the Workplace: Judges and the Common Law, 114 NW. U. 
L. REV. ONLINE 177 (2019). 
 37 BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 75–112. 
 38 Reyes, supra note 36, at 179–81. 
 39 Id. at 183; see BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 34 (describing fellow-feeling as related to the 
understanding that another has experienced harm, and that the effect of judicial opinions is to “call on the 
public to feel how someone else once felt thwarted”). 
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reminds readers not only that judges decide cases involving women’s 
employment, but also that judges themselves are employers.40 For this 
reason, Reyes urges judges to “accept responsibility for the failure to develop 
the common law to liberate women.”41 Reyes herself worked as a career clerk 
and staff attorney in the federal court system before becoming a law 
professor,42 so she knows first-hand of what she speaks. 
Chon’s and Reyes’s contributions show how Bernstein’s fundamental 
understanding of the vitality of the common law can enrich the 
understanding of rights in other areas. By using examples from intellectual 
property and employment law, Chon and Reyes use the common law to 
advance claims where rights and negative liberties intersect. 
IV. VIEWPOINTS ON THE COMMON LAW 
The third intellectual move—viewing the common law from the 
perspective of historically (and frequently presently) disadvantaged 
people—grounds Professor Teri McMurtry-Chubb’s Essay, In Search of the 
Common Law Inside the Black Female Body. McMurtry-Chubb 
contemplates the economic operations of the common law to draw attention 
to its failure to protect enslaved black women.43 The common law also 
entrenched control by white men (and women) over every aspect of black 
bodies.44 McMurtry-Chubb cites a set of medical directives that one 
plantation owner wrote and distributed in 1843 to all of the overseers of his 
slaves. Black women’s bodies were, from the owner’s perspective, “valuable 
for both their physical and reproductive labor.”45 In other words, the slave 
owner viewed women not only as workers, but also as property producers 
because the woman could bear children—future accessions to the “wealth” 
of the owner. Through primary sources, McMurtry-Chubb brings attention 
to the ways that black women’s bodies routinely were and are subject to 
violation, invasion, and aggression. McMurtry-Chubb notes that Bernstein 
would agree that these constitute gross violations of black women’s common 
law rights and invite conversation about how to make those rights 
meaningful.46 
 
 40 Reyes, supra note 36, at 181. 
 41 Id. at 186. 
 42 See Maritza Reyes Faculty Biography, FLA. AGRIC. & MECHANICAL U. C. L., 
https://law.famu.edu/faculty/maritza-reyes [https://perma.cc/YX79-ZKW5]. 
 43 Teri McMurtry-Chubb, In Search of the Common Law Inside the Black Female Body, 114 NW. U. 
L. REV. ONLINE 187 (2019). 
 44 Id. at 189. 
 45 Id. at 188. 
 46 Id. at 192, 194; BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 26 (“Slavery presents numerous examples of how the 
common law failed to live up to its commitments.”). 
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CONCLUSION: THE COMMON LAW AS SILVER SLIPPERS 
After reading these Essays, along with Professor Bernstein’s Response, 
the astute reader naturally might ask where and how to proceed. In The 
Wonderful Wizard of Oz, after Glinda reveals to Dorothy that the Silver 
Slippers always had the power to accomplish what Dorothy wanted the 
most—to return home to Kansas—Dorothy bids a fond farewell to the 
Cowardly Lion, Tin Woodman, and Scarecrow.47 Just three clicks of the 
heels of her Silver Slippers and Dorothy is back in Kansas, free to pursue her 
own destiny. So too, now that Bernstein has illuminated that the common 
law has always been available to women as a liberty-enhancing system, 
women (and their allies) can make greater use of the common law to advance 
women’s liberation and equality. But while Dorothy lands in Kansas without 
the Silver Slippers,48 the common law will not be lost through use. To the 
contrary, the more that women use common law arguments to assert their 
rights to control what happens to their own bodies, the more likely it is that 
judges will adopt this reasoning. One common law decision begets another. 
The Silver Slippers may have been single-use, but the common law can 
improve with each case. 
 
 47  Baum, supra note †.  
 48 Id. at 259 (after landing in Kansas, “Dorothy stood up and found she was in her stocking-feet. For 
the Silver Shoes had fallen off in her flight through the air, and were lost forever in the desert.”). 
